By F. G. SMITH

The very fact that books on religious subjects still form the largest part of the literature of the Christian world proves beyond all question the supreme importance of the theme; that it does not belong to the dim, distant past, but possesses within itself the germs of immortality. It lives forever.

Systematic theology, because of the nature of the subject itself, calls for frequent restatement. The religion of the Bible embraces in its scope that which is of supreme importance to our race. Men everywhere are called upon to accept it. Its doctrines relate not only to our origin and final destiny, but they make great demands upon us now by impressing the law of accountability upon the conscience. It is the special province of theology to make these doctrines and obligations acceptable to the reason. But the intellectual demands vary in accordance with the progress and thought-movements of the times. Thus change in the thought-sentiment of any age may require a change in theological emphasis. In other words, the same subject must be stated in a different form or approached from a different angle.

If a work on systematic theology had been written in the early part of the fourth century, when the Arian controversy was at its height, its author would have given greater attention to the doctrine of the divine Trinity than has any writer in subsequent ages. In a theology written during the period of the Christological controversies the Person of Christ would have come in for a more elaborate treatment. About a hundred years ago necessitarianism and free will were great topics of theological discussion. Every theologian of the time enlarged upon that subject, from a conviction either that it was necessary for him to argue at length for necessitarianism, or else that since he was free he should use his freedom by opposing it.

It is perhaps natural that every generation should consider itself vastly superior to all preceding ones. We now smile when we read concerning some of the theological controversies of the past. But the problems of that day were very real to the people of that day. We should also remember that the law of human progress and development is still at work, and some day others who are faced with a different situation from ours will from their own estimate of our efforts to meet the problems of our day. So it becomes us to be modest. But these problems are real to us and we must meet them.

During the last half-century the work of specialists in geology, paleontology, biology, and other departments of scientific research has given rise to a new philosophy of life. This philosophy is gradually forcing its way from the institutions of higher learning down to our primary schools. It is already having its effect within the department of the church of today, and it calls for a fresh examination of the whole problem of theism and theology proper the doctrine of God, creation, sin, divine revelation, and the relation of God to the world. This alone is sufficient reason for the appearance of another work on theology, a work adapted to the particular needs and demands of our time.

There is also another reason why we need a new treatment of the problems of theology. With all due respect to the efforts of past theologians, it must be admitted that most of them have labored either to create unique systems of theological thought or else to defend the particular schools with which they happened to be identified. Because of this particular bias it is practically impossible to point out a work on systematic theology that we can recommend unqualifiedly. We are now learning that no school of theology has a monopoly on the truth, but that elements of truth are to be found in all of them. We also see that the effort to emphasize particular doctrines to the exclusion of others, while effective to a certain extent in defending what may be believed to be true, is, nevertheless, not a very successful method of finding the whole truth. It is therefore evident that the only correct method in theology must to quite a degree be eclectic in character. It must bring together and unite in a systematic whole all the scattered principles of truth.

Another reason for the present work is worthy of particular mention. While as already intimated the older standard works on systematic theology are, on account of their particular bias, now unacceptable for general use, most of the more recent theologians show higher critical bearings and a tendency to capitulate to the demands of modern religious liberalism. We cannot but regard this as a danger-signal. We believe that the great mass of Christian worshipers still believe in the substantial character of historic Christianity and are firmly convinced that it has for its foundation eternal truth and verity. It is therefore fitting that a work on Christian doctrine, adjusted to the needs of our time, should now appear; a work soundly orthodox, committed to fundamental truth: God the supreme ruler of the universe; divine creation, the fall, redemption, divine revelation, miracles and prophecy, inspiration of the Scriptures; a superhuman Christ, miraculously begotten, crucified as an appointed offering for sin, resurrected from the dead by omnipotent power, and exalted to the throne of majesty in the heavens, from whence in due time he shall come to earth again, visibly and personally, to judge the quick and the dead

It may be appropriate to say a word also concerning what may not properly be expected in any new work on systematic theology. In the first place, a great degree of originality as to subject matter should not be looked for. Theology has for ages engaged the careful attention of thousands of thoughtful minds. It would seem that truth has been approached from almost every conceivable angle and that the church has met almost every possible kind of heresy. The present-day author is therefore restricted, in that he does not have a fresh and original field of inquiry. At every turn he meets this sentiment, as succinctly expressed by another writer, Whatever is true in theology can not be new: and whatever is new can not be true He is therefore practically confined to a restatement of what has already been stated a hundred times or more. But as already intimated, there arises frequently the actual necessity of theological restatement. Causes operating both within the church and outside of it shift the points of chief interest and inquiry, and these call for new presentations of theological truth adapted to the particular needs of each succeeding generation. In meeting this demand, however, there may be the newness of additional emphasis and freshness in the individual style of presentation.

In view of the present-day conditions already referred to, the author has in this work given particular prominence to theism, apologetics, theology proper, and anthropology. It is not the ordinary doctrines of the Bible that are now made the subject of direct attack; it is rather the very foundations upon which the Christian structure rests. Another contributing factor may also be noticed. This work was designed primarily for a textbook in the Anderson Bible School and Seminary. The author having in mind the general drift today toward modern religious liberalism, which subject is not adequately treated in other available books on Christian doctrine, has felt the necessity of a more particular emphasis on the foundation principles of the faith. In my opinion this is a fortunate choice, for he has thereby made a more valuable contribution to our department of theological literature.

The author is teacher of Systematic Theology in the Anderson Bible School and Seminary, Anderson, Ind. The present book is the natural outgrowth of his work in that institution. And while Christian Theology was designed primarily as a textbook for use in his theological classes, it need not and should not be restricted to them. My purpose in writing these lines is to introduce and commend it to a wider constituency. It is the product of patient, conscientious effort and is worthy of the careful consideration of students and of all truth-loving people everywhere.

PREFACE

The purpose of this work is to set forth in concise and systematic form the evidences, doctrines, and institutions of the Christian faith. Much of what is contained in the following pages has been given to students in the classroom as lectures from year to year and in the form of typewritten outlines, which I have used in teaching.

In preparing this work the aim has been to treat the subject with such a degree of brevity as is consistent with clearness and strength of argument. I have had as my object in writing, the production of such a textbook as I should wish to place in the hands of students in the classroom beginning the study of systematic theology, and also I have sought to adapt the discussion to meet the needs of the many ministers who must gain most of their knowledge of the subject through individual private study. I have also endeavored so to present the subject that even Sunday school teachers and other laymen who meek to be informed in doctrine can, by a thoughtful reading of it, obtain a clearer view of Christian truth and a firmer conviction that it is truth. Certainly the truths of Christianity were intended for the average man as well as for the student and ought to be taught so all persons of ordinary intelligence can understand them. With this in view I have purposely avoided as much as possible an abstract style and technical terms, or when the latter are used I have often defined them. The omission of technical terms is also in harmony with the tendency of the more recent writers on theology, about one of whom it has been said that by him theology has been freed from the bonds of a scholastic phraseology and taught to speak again an English pure and undefiled

The subjects treated and the order of their treatment are such as are commonly found in a work of this kind. A theological writer can scarcely hope to say much that has not been stated in some of the many works of the past, but with the development of thought in each succeeding age a restatement of the truth is needed. New developments in science and religion require a change of emphasis in presenting the truths of Christianity. At the present time the tendencies to undue religious liberalism must be met by conservative Christian theology. As the deism of the eighteenth century and the Unitarian defection of the last century were successfully met and overcome by strongly asserting and vigorously defending with sound argument the truths then attacked so it will be in the present conflict. And yet while we strive in defense of the gospel we do so with the happy confidence that truth will win, for men can not long deny those great truths that are fundamental to the needs of their natures and to their present and eternal happiness.

I have endeavored here to present the truth positively. I believe what I have here written, and my convictions grow stronger continually with the study and reflection of the passing years. I prefer to glory in believing so much rather than in believing so little, because Gods blessings are promised to those who believe rather than to those who doubt and criticize. I have aimed at clearness rather than a flowery style. Inasmuch as theology can be comprehended well only by a practical application of its truths to the heart and life, I have freely employed the homiletical method in these pages. The attempt to present theology abstractly is not only unscientific but also uninteresting and even sometimes repulsive to the truly devout heart.

I desire to express appreciation for helpful suggestions for the improvement of this work from C. W. Naylor, E. A. Bear-don, and F. G. Smith, who have read it in manuscript form. I esteem their judgment highly because of their wide experience as practical preachers of the gospel and as writers on religious and theological themes.

With a fervent prayer to Him who is the source of all truth, and whose guidance I have constantly sought while writing the following pages, that by his blessing the perusal of them may be enlightening to their readers, this work is given to the public. Anderson Bible School and Seminary, Anderson, Indiana, December 6, 1924.

Christian Theology

A Systematic Statement

of Christian Doctrine for

the Use of Theological Students

By

RUSSELL R. BYRUM

WARNER PRESS

Anderson, Indiana

Fourth Printing 1972

INTRODUCTION

I. Idea and Contents of Theology

1. Definition. Theology is the science about God and of the relations existing between him and his creation. Such a definition is in harmony with the sense of the two Greek terms θεός (theos) and λόγος (logos), from which it is formed, and whose primary meaning is a discourse about God. It is the science of religion.

2. Religion and Theology. Religion is mans experience with the supernatural, with his Creator, and it is so grounded in the constitution of man that he is away and everywhere religious. Theology is the intellectual aspect of religious. Religion is spiritual experience, and theology is the rationale and explanation of it. Religion and theology are related somewhat as are the heavenly bodies and astronomy, the earth and geology, and the human body and physiology. As the stars and the earth existed before man had any knowledge concerning them, so men are religious before they formulate theology, and believe instinctively before they reason. Not alone Christianity, but every religion has its theology. Whatever reason the most degraded fetish-worshiper has for his religious actions, that is his theology, crude though it may be. And from that degraded form of religion all the way up through all the great ethnic religions and including Christianity itself, theology, or the intellectual aspect of religion, is a necessity of the mind.

3. Main Divisions of Theological Science. Theology in this broad sense is logically and commonly divided into four main divisions: (1) Exegetical, (2) Historical, (3) Systematic, and (4) Practical.

(1) Exegetical theology has to do with the interpretation of the Scripture and includes the study of (a) biblical introduction both general and special (b) exegesis proper, or the interpretation of the sacred text itself: (c) special departments such as prophetical interpretation, typology, and biblical theology. In relation to Christian theology as a whole, the function of exegetical theology is to provide the material from which the various doctrines are to be constructed

(2) Historical theology treats of the development and history of true religion in all past ages and includes (a) the history of the Bible, or the record of Gods dealings with men in revealing the way of salvation as set forth in the Scriptures; (b) the history of the church, or the record of events relative to Christianity; (c) the history of Christian doctrine, which is in the truest sense historical theology. This branch of theology also provides material that has a bearing upon a proper presentation of Christian doctrine.

(3) Systematic theology, which is next in logical order, is Christian doctrine arranged in a system. It is not only a systematic arrangement of the various doctrines of Christianity, but also a systematic presentation of the various elements of a doctrine showing the process of induction by which it is determined. It not only decides that logically the doctrine of God must precede the doctrine of sin, but it shows the reasons in logical order why we believe there is a God and sin, and the nature of each. The subdivisions of this main division of theology will be given later.

(4) Practical theology has for its foundation systematic theology, as the latter has its basis in exegetical theology. It has to do with the application of theology to the individual life and the Propagation of it in the world. It is both a science and an art. It includes (a) homiletics, or the preparation and delivery of sermons;

(b) Christian ethics, or Christian duties; (c) pastoral theology, which includes all other methods and means relative to the propagation of the gospel not included in homiletics.

4. Other Designating Terms Used with Theology. Theology in its generic sense is also used with various other differentiating terms. Natural theology is used to designate that body of truths which may be learned from nature concerning Gods existence and attributes, and concerning mans moral obligations to God. This knowledge includes not only what men actually learn direct and alone from nature without the aid of revelation, but also what may be so learned even though the facts are suggested by revelation. Many of the deeper truths of Christianity, however, cannot be known from nature. Natural theology, then, is a classification in respect to its source, and is commonly so called to distinguish it from revealed theology, or that class of truths known to us only by the Scriptures. Revealed theology is also designated according to its source. Dogmatic theology is to be distinguished from systematic and Biblical in that it usually is devoted to the setting forth of the doctrines of a particular school of thought or sect. It deals with human creeds as its material rather than the Bible, or at least is not limited to the Scriptures. Biblical theology is the study of those truths of theology furnished us by the Scriptures in the order and according to the method by which they are there given. It recognizes the progressive revelation in the Bible. As an example, if the Biblical doctrine of sin is to be studied it traces it through the various books of the Old Testament, through the sayings of Jesus in the synoptic Gospels, finds what John said about it in his Gospel and Epistles, and also traces it in the Epistles of Paul. It may thus trace a doctrine through the whole Bible or only in a particular portion of it. All true theology is Biblical, but in this technical sense of the term a particular aspect of Biblical study is described.

5. Use of the Term Theology as to Extent The term theology is used in three different senses as to extent: (1) It is used in the broad generic sense to include all the various aspects of theology and larger divisions of theological science. (2) It is used in the restricted sense of the original ground-term to designate the study especially about the nature and works of God. This is often called theology proper and is but one of the subdivisions of systematic theology. (3) It in used most commonly to designate systematic theology. This is in harmony with our first definition and is doubtless the most proper use of the term, because the true science about God must describe not only Gods nature and works but also all the relations existing between him and his works. Then Christian theology in its proper sense is synonymous with systematic Christian doctrine.

II. Importance and Value of Theology

To speak flippantly or contemptuously of theology is to do so of doctrine, concerning which the apostle Paul admonishes Timothy to take heed This erroneous attitude is doubtless the result of abuses and error in attempts at theology and especially a reflection of that disposition of modern liberalism and free thinking which would reject every divinely given standard of truth and exalt human reason instead. The devout and wise Christian will beware of such an attitude and also remember that there are not only false theologies or doctrines, but also true Christian theology or doctrines from God.

1. Needed for clear Conceptions. The Christian minister or teacher especially needs a knowledge of theology. It is his message. He should know what is truth in order that on the one hand he may not omit the teaching of important doctrines necessary to the well being of his hearers, and on the other that he may not add to the truth that which is erroneous. He needs such knowledge that his message may he balanced and consistent with itself. He must not emphasize one aspect of truth or of Christian experience to the excluding or obscuring of other equally important truths. The successful preacher must get past that mere fragmentary knowledge of truth and attain to a comprehensive grasp of it. The quality of the preachers theology determines largely what will be the character of his congregation as a whole and the individual Christian experience of each member. The doctrine preached to and accepted by people is the mold in which they are made religiously. It is the faithful preaching of sound doctrine that has effected all the great reformations of the church. It is also that which will enable the church to maintain a high standard of religious life when it is once attained.

2. Needed for Strong Convictions. And not only the teacher of religion needs a knowledge of theology, but every one will have firmer convictions of truth and be more stable in Christian experience if he knows the Christian doctrines as interdependent and mutually supporting each other. A bringing together of the teaching of Scripture and a careful study in the light of Scripture of any of the great fundamental doctrines of Christianity can not fail to strengthen faith and enrich one in Christian experience. Such study will clear away confusion and inspire to more earnest piety and service. It is true that in the early stages of such study doubts may arise as the mind is confronted with problems that were before not supposed to exist; but such doubts are not dangerous as they at first seem, but are necessary to healthful progress. A blind piety that dare not think is certainly not of the enduring nature that can give permanence to Christian character. Neither will theological study deaden the affections, as has been wrongly supposed, if it is properly pursued. If the truth learned about God and his will concerning man is not merely held abstractly but applies to the heart and life, it can not fail to make one a better Christian. It has been well said that the strongest Christians are those who have the firmest grasp upon the great doctrines of Christianity, and the piety that can be injured by the systematic exhibition of them must be weak, or mystical, or mistaken

3. Needed for Intellectual Satisfaction. Man has not only an emotional nature, but also an intellectual nature. God is the author of both, and designs that man serve him with both the heart and the mind. In fact, ones emotions are largely control by ones thinking. But the question may be asked: Why a scientific arrangement of religious truth? Why may we not receive Christian truths as they are set forth in the Bible, and save ourselves the trouble of theological science? The human mind is constituted with an organizing instinct. The normal mind cannot rest in confusion of known facts, nor endure their apparent contradiction. The tendency to systematic thinking and arrangement of known facts is proportionate to the degree of ones mental culture and capacity. The mind is naturally so constituted that it must classify and arrange these facts of which it comes to know. God might have given truth in a scientific form instead of in historical form as it is set forth to a great extent in the Bible, just as he might have provided man food and clothes or secular knowledge without human effort. But work is a law of life throughout the whole creation. And in religion effort is needful, not only for the development of a beautiful Christian character, but also in order to an adequate knowledge of things divine. In nature, God has furnished facts which men classify and systematize and from which they make inductions of other facts and principles which constitute valuable knowledge. The starry sky supplies the facts of astronomy, but it was only by generalizing from many of those facts carefully gathered that the important principle of gravitation was discovered. Likewise, in the Bible and in nature God has furnished us the facts of theology. Now he expects us to arrange these facts in logical order, and by such arrangement, reconciliation, and comparison to clarify our knowledge of those facts and by processes of induction or deduction even to learn other truths. As an example, the Bible furnishes us the facts that the Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Spirit is God, and that these three are not identical, yet that there is but one God. These are the facts. Theology places the facts into proper relation to each other, and the result is the doctrine of the Divine Trinity. The doctrine of the twofold nature of Christ is likewise a product of theology, and was wrought out only after centuries of struggle. Still another reason for theology is that God has been pleased in the New Testament to supply us with parts of a system of theology already worked out, which is reason for believing he expects us to work it out still farther.

As in other fields of knowledge the mind cannot be content with a multitude of undigested facts, so it is in theology. It has been demonstrated often that only as the mind knows Bible truth in logical order can it know really. This is the reason why in all ages and among all religious bodies systems of theology have been constructed.

III. Sources of Theology

The materials from which a system of Christian theology is constructed may be gathered from any source where they can be found. God himself is the ultimate source of theology, as the earth is of the facts of the science of geology. The two principal sources are nature and revelation. Nature is a mediate source and revelation is an immediate source of theological truths.

1. Nature a Source of Theology. By nature is meant Gods creation in its widest extent. We may learn about God, not only from physical nature with all that it includes, but also much may be learned of him from the spiritual creation as we know it in mans mental and moral constitution. Not only in lower forms of creation, but also and especially in man, who is created in Gods image, may much be learned. And, again, the divine truth nature reveals to us, includes not only that from man regarded objectively, but also those truths that may be known through intuition, the logical reason, and the moral nature. The character of God may be known in a certain measure by what he has made, much as we may know somewhat about a man by the work that he does.

That nature is a proper source of knowledge concerning God is also directly stated in the Scriptures. The heavens declare the glory of God; and the firmament showeth his handiwork. Day unto day uttereth speech, and night unto night showeth knowledge. There is no speech nor language where their voice is not heard. Their line is gone out through all the earth, and their words to the end of the world (Psa. 19: 1-4). Here the inspired writer asserts that nature teaches men about God and that such witness is perpetual though it is not given in articulate speech. The apostle Paul not only asserts this same fact, but also directs attention to the fact that the clearness of the revelation of God in nature is such that mends consciences are thereby obligated to serve him. That which may be known of God is manifest in them; for God hath showed it unto them. For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead; so that they are without excuse: because that, when they knew God, they glorified him not as God, neither were thankful (Rom. 1: 19-21). A neglect of this important source of divine truth is a great loss. While revelation is far more important as a source of theology, yet the Scriptures are intended not to exclude but to supplement the facts we learn from nature. The reversion from nature as a source of theology by Watson and others is doubtless due to the undue stress on it by the deism or natural religion with which they came into conflict. Both deeper love for God and a clearer knowledge respecting him is the inevitable consequence of a devout contemplation of his works in nature.

2. Revelation the Source of Theology. However much we may study God in nature, yet it is evident that the truth there learned is incomplete and insufficient to enable us to serve him acceptably. It is here that deism unduly stressed the value of natural theology. The history of mankind is evidence enough of the insufficiency of the light of nature to show men the way to God. It failed to deliver the ancient Gentile world from its gross wickedness, and modern heathenism still testifies that even with all its elaborate philosophies natural religion has failed to save the individual or lift up society. Something more is needed.

The manifestation of God in nature needs the illumination of a supernatural and immediate revelation. This revelation must begin where the natural ends and tell more than can be learned from natural sources. Nature makes known the existence of God, but revelation is needed that we may know his relations with men and how to serve him acceptably. Sin is a fearful fact that is evident in the individual heart and life and in the life of the race, but revelation is needed to make known the glorious truth of free pardon through the sacrificial suffering of a Divine Redeemer. Future retribution and life beyond this life is universally recognized because it is an intuition of mans nature, but what comfort can come from such knowledge if no divine revelation tells us how to be ready? Such a supernatural revelation is needed, and such we have in the Christian Scriptures. This divinely attested revelation is the source of theology.

Revelation is not necessarily limited to the Scriptures, as both before and since the Scriptures were given God has been pleased to reveal himself supernaturally to pious persons. Such revelation is desirable and needed under certain circumstances, but it is not valuable as material for theology, and because not divinely attested to men generally is not properly a source of theology except as it harmonizes with and supports the truth already revealed in the Scriptures.

Revelation is to be clearly distinguished from natural theology, not that its theology is unnatural, but to show that its communication is supernatural and direct. Nature and revelation have appropriately been called Gods two great books God is equally the author of both. They are not contradictory, but complementary of each other. Nature is first in order of time, but revelation is first in importance; and except for the reality of the truths of revelation, nature would not be what it is. And with revelation, nature is a more fruitful source of truth than it could otherwise be.

3. Erroneous Source of Theology. The Roman Catholic Church holds her traditions, according to the decree of the Council of Trent, to be an equal source of truth or authority with the Scriptures. Doubtless in the period of the apostles the traditions of these holy men had certain value in this respect; but because of the corruption of the church resulting in a consequent corruption of the traditions, they certainly are not now, as represented by the Pope, a proper source of theology. Neither the decrees of the Pope nor those of any other individual or company of men representing a body of Christian people are proper material for theology. Creeds, symbols, or confessions, both ancient and modern, even though such are formulated by the concurrence of every member composing a religious body, cannot be admitted as a source of true Christian theology.

A second mistaken source of theology is mysticism. Mysticism claims an immediate insight into truth independent of nature or revelation. In relation to religious truth, it professes a direct and personal revelation from God. It is doubtless Scriptural and in harmony with the facts of the best Christian experience to allow such higher communication with God. There is a true mysticism that means much to the Christian in spiritual illumination and higher experimental knowledge of divine truth.

But this is not an additional revelation equal to the Scriptures; it is usually only an illumination of that already revealed. In all the past centuries mysticism has not added any essentially new truth to what is known of God through nature and revelation. That false mysticism which pretends to add to the truths of Scripture various ideas, often unscriptural, that the Lord showed to the mystic, is to be rejected as a source of theology.

A third mistaken source of theology is rationalism. This error is the opposite of mysticism in recognizing too much of theology as from man while mysticism recognizes too much as coming directly from God. Reason in the broad sense has an important place in receiving and appropriating the facts of revelation. But that common modern tendency is wrong which would make mere human reasoning in the narrow sense the ultimate source of all divine truth, even to the exclusion of the truths of Scripture if those truths do not agree with previous conclusions of reason.

Is the inner Christian experience, or Christian consciousness, a proper source of theology? Every devout Christian recognizes the reality of Christian experience. He is aware of a remarkable change that took place in his soul at the time he accepted Christ and which has continued to be realized more or less vividly since that time. May he by a careful study of this experience know the essential nature of conversion? Often devout persons have accepted their own experience as a source of truth and preached it as a standard for all men, measuring all others by their own experience. But such standards are as various as the number of those whose experiences they represent. Therefore, they cannot be a proper source of theology. Another class who hold the Christian consciousness or experience as a source of theology are those too liberal theologians who assume that revelation was originally given only through experience, and not in words; that the truths contained in the Scriptures were originally the result of inner experience only, and that consequently truth may as well be learned from Christian experience today as a source of theology.

Doubtless Christian experience is corroborative of the teachings of revelation, and by such experience one can more clearly interpret the Scriptures. If one has experienced regeneration, he will more clearly understand the words of the apostle Paul, If any man be in Christ, he is a new creature The Christian experience of an individual or of a particular age will necessarily modify the conception of theology for that person or age, but this does not mean it is a proper source of divine truth. It cannot be a proper source, because of the variation already mentioned. This variation is due to ones natural temperament, environment, and to outside influence, and especially to the theology he holds. The Mohammedans religious experience differs much from that of the Buddhist because their beliefs differ. Likewise the experiences of the Roman Catholic and Protestant are not the same; and as a result of varying belief, experience differs between Calvinists and Arminians, and between Unitarians and Trinitarians. Even with those holding the same general creed, experience varies according to their particular individual interpretation of their creed. Evidently, therefore, the law of Christian experience is that such experience is the result of Christian truth, or the individual conception of it, and not its cause; it is the offspring of theology and not its source.

IV. Method of Theology

1. Need of System. Experience has furnished abundant proof that the truths of religion, like any other branch of knowledge, can be more clearly grasped by the mind if those truths are presented in a logical order. The constitution of the mind requires such presentation. Also by such systematic arrangement of theological facts it is possible to draw out general principles and by such generalization to increase theological knowledge. The results gained by such systematization are sufficient justification of it. And in view of this the ungrounded objections that religion is of the heart and not of the head, or that systematization makes for religious bigotry, need not be considered. The ancient theologians, including even such able writers as Origen, Augustine, and John of Damascus who is commonly represented as the father of systematic theology, lacked system in their theological writings. And it is safe to say that as a result of this lack of orderly treatment there was a corresponding lack of clearness in their theology.

Two opposite dangers must be avoided in the arrangement of theology over systematizing on the one extreme, and fragmentariness on the other. Over systematizing has been a not uncommon fault of modern theology and has placed an unnecessary burden of repetition and speculation upon it. In an attempt to make a perfectly balanced system, writers on the subject have yielded too often to the temptation to resort to speculation to fill up in their systems the gaps that resulted from a lack of revealed truth on certain subjects, such as the nature of the Divine Trinity or of events at the second advent of Christ. Others in endeavoring to keep away from this danger have fallen into the opposite one of treating the subject in a fragmentary manner that fails to satisfy the mind and to exhibit many truths that may be known.

2. Various Methods of Systemization. A great variety of methods of arrangement have been followed in the treatment of theology. The order of presentation of the different parts of theology is determined largely by the type of mind of the writer. But especially is it determined by the particular aspect of the subject to be emphasized. There is nothing in the nature of the subject to require oneness of method in systematizing the doctrines of theology. Those who follow the analytic method of Calixtus begin with the idea of blessedness, the assumed end of all things, and reason to the means of securing it. Others, including Chalmers, begin with sin, mans disease, and reason to the remedy. Others approach the subject from still other angles and by other processes. The purpose of many theologians of the past and present has been to find one doctrine or principle out of which all others may be developed. Doubtless no such unity is possible. The inductive, not the deductive, is the true method of theology. Theology must be constructed from the various elements to be found in nature and revelation, and cannot be deduced from one general principle or doctrine, whether that doctrine be Christ, sin, blessedness, or any other.

3. Method of This Work. The most common order of treatment of theology, and the one followed in this work, may be properly termed the synthetic method. It consists in bringing together the various elements of theology and arranging them into a logical whole. This mode of treatment is in conformity with the nature of the subject. The order of the larger divisions of this work, beginning with God and passing to the consideration of events at the final consummation, is not only a logical order, but to a considerable extent the chronological one. The order of this work is as follows:

I. Introduction.

II. Existence of God, or Theism.

III. Evidences of Divine Revelation, or Apologetics.

IV. Nature and Works of God, or Theology Proper.

V. Doctrine of Man, or Anthropology.

VI. Salvation through Christ, or Soteriology.

VII. The Church, or Ecclesiology.

VIII. Last Things, or Eschatology.

It is probably sufficient as an apology for this division and arrangement of the subject that it is clear and logical, and designed to give a degree of prominence and emphasis to the various leading phases of theology that will be helpful to a comprehensive grasp of it. Also these divisions in this order do not vary greatly from that followed by the majority of the most respected theological writers of the present day, as shown by the following lists of the main divisions of those named.

Strong: (1) Prolegomena. (2) Existence of God. (3) The Scriptures. (4) The Nature, Decrees, and Works of God. (5) Anthropology. (6) Soteriology. (7) Ecclesiology. (8) Eschatology.

Raymond: (1) Apologetics. (2) Theology Proper. (3) Anthropology. (4) Soteriology. (5) Eschatology. (6) Ethics. (7) Ecclesiology.

Hodge: (1) Introduction. (2) Theology Proper. (3) Anthropology. (4) Soteriology. (5) Eschatology.

Miley: (1) Theism. (2) Theology. (3) Anthropology. (4) Christology. (5) Soteriology. (6) Eschatology.

Shedd: (1) Theological Introduction. (2) Bibliology. (3) Theology. (4) Anthropology. (5) Christology. (6) Soteriology. (7) Eschatology.

In the present work the results sought seem to require as many main divisions as are made of the subject. A certain recent writer strongly criticizes the discussion of the divine revelation after theism, as is done by Strong, on the ground that it logically precedes theology and belongs in the introduction. In reply it may be reasoned that it is logical to show there is a God before the notion of a revelation from him can be given consideration. Certainly the vital importance of the proofs that the Scriptures are a divine revelation and the present controversy on the question are reason enough for the prominence given apologetics here.

4. Terminology. Theological writers of the past have been much given to the use of technical terms of Greek origin, and as a result their works have been forbidding to the uneducated person. The leading writers of the present generation, however, have, almost without exception, reverted to simple, every-day terminology, which is certainly a great gain. Doubtless the technical terms have the advantage of definiteness in their favor, and are preferable from the strictly scientific viewpoint; but the simpler terms are desirable for practical purposes, and the practical end of theology must not be lost sight of. The word man is a better term than anthropology, and salvation than Soteriology In this work the main divisions are designated with simple descriptive terms, and to these are added the technical terms to furnish whatever superior definiteness attaches to them and to explain and to be explained by the simpler designation.

V. Qualifications for the Study of Theology

1. Spiritual Qualifications. Probably the most important qualification for the study of theology pious spirit, even though it is not the only one needed. Noting can take the place of a personal experimental acquaintance with God and a sincere desire to please him. Only to one with such an attitude of heart does God reveal his truth. Jesus said, If any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God, or whether I speak of myself To know the science about God as it ought to be known one must know God himself, and this is possible only by experience. A mind unsympathetic toward truth cannot understand the truth. It is here that the destructive critics of the Bible have so commonly failed as experts in that in which they assumed to be authority. Rightly to understand regeneration one must have been regenerated. To know the nature of the Holy Spirit baptism one must have been baptized with the Holy Spirit. Not that experience is the source of truth, but such experience does mean much for a proper conception of that truth revealed in the Scriptures. And especially does one need the enlightenment of the Spirit of God. For the Spirit searcheth all things, yea, the deep things of God. The things of God knoweth no man, but the Spirit of God

2. Qualities of Mind. Every one may profitably study theology, but all are not equally endowed with those native and acquired qualities of mind that are especially valuable in such study. The successful study of theology requires not only a devout heart, but also a well balanced and thoroughly disciplined mind. Because theology has to do with the greatest subject in the universe, it is deserving of the thought of the most powerful intellects. The student of theology needs mental equilibrium. He must be able to reason well, to discern relations clearly, and to move accurately from premise to conclusion. Also he needs keen insight and careful discrimination. While it is true that the wayfaring men, though fools may experience Christianity, yet a keen mind is needed to grasp the deep and sometimes abstract things of God. A trained mind is needed, as only such a mind can gather together and hold in its grasp many facts at once, and suspend judgment in the drawing out of general principles until mature consideration of all the elements in each is given. Also not only a logical mind is needed but also a well-developed power of intuition is needed. Certain first truths, such as the existence, of God or the reality of the future life, can be known better by intuition, or the minds primitive convictions, than by processes of demonstration or logic.

Other qualities of mind needed are love for truth, sincerity, reverence, humility, candor, patience, loyalty to facts, and the courage of ones convictions. Love for truth will keep one from the opposite extremes of conservatism and progress. Extreme conservatism makes much of the old paths whether they are right or not, and persistently holds to the way in which it happens to be even though the Spirit of God is endeavoring to lead into a richer and deeper spiritual life than that yet attained. It prizes the truth already gained and has the advantage of a settled state, but this is done at the expense of progress into a clearer light and truth, and also it leads into undesirable dogmatism. The extremely progressive attitude is also equally dangerous in causing one to cast away tried and tested truths that have been bequeathed as a sacred treasure by godly men of the past for what seems to be truth but is not. Put proper love for truth will lead one to seek for greater light and at the same time cause him to hold fast all that he has received that is really truth.

3. Educational Qualifications. A thorough knowledge of the Bible is of first importance to the study of Christian theology. Biblical theology must precede systematic theology. One must first know his Bible as to its contents. This will enable him to gather together the various facts of Scripture bearing on a subject. Next he must know the meaning of his Bible. If he misinterprets the meaning of the statements of Scripture he will probably fail to formulate sound doctrines from them. He should also be familiar with the history of Christian doctrine, as it has been held in past ages and as it is held by those of his own time. Without such knowledge he is liable to commit himself to a theory that has been exploded centuries ago. A familiarity with the original languages of the Scripture will be found of great value in interpreting it.

Nor will the student of theology find knowledge of secular branches amiss. A Knowledge of history, philosophy, and human nature is valuable. Especially does he need to study physical science as well as mental science, as from these modern infidelity under the cloak of science is attacking Christianity and the theologian must be prepared to defend the truth. He should also be familiar with the life and spirit of his own times if he would successfully refute the current errors and adapt his message to those to whom he speaks. This means he must not be a recluse, but one who knows the thoughts of the living as well as the writings of the dead. To know people one must mingle with them. Without such association to give freshness to ones thought one is almost certain to become stagnant and abstract in his thinking.

PART I

EXISTENCE OF GOD, OR THEISM

CHAPTER I

ORIGIN OF OUR IDEA OF GOD

The existence of God as used here means the existence of the Infinite Person, the creator and sustainer of all things. The term theism is commonly used in this sense and has more definite meaning than the expression existence of God By the latter expression is too often meant a pantheistic or other conception of God than that which is revealed in the Scriptures, and which is characteristic of Christianity.

Belief in God has been common to men in all ages, nations, and conditions of life. It is practically universal. It has been and is as widespread as religion, and necessarily so, because it is fundamental to religion. There can be no religion in the exact sense of the term without the idea of God, even though that idea may be much perverted.

But how came this universal idea of God? If to a particular person were proposed the question of how the idea of God first came into his mind he would probably be unable to tell. It was there from the time of his earliest recollection, though possibly not so clear or in a form so highly developed as he later came to hold. The most important theories of the origin of the idea or (1) that it is an intuition (2) that it is from reasoning. (3) that it is by an original divine revelation handed down by tradition.

I. The Knowledge of God as an Intuition

1. Intuition in General. By intuitions we mean that sort of knowledge that is due to that inherent energy of the mind that gives rise to certain thoughts and which is differentiated from knowledge gained by instruction from without, by reasoning or by experience. The term is used to designate the source of the knowledge as well as the ideas themselves. Intuitions are also known as first truths, truths of the primary reason, and innate knowledge. Intuitive knowledge is not ideas or knowledge which the infant finds himself in conscious possession of at birth, but rather ideas that have their birth in the mind spontaneously when the proper conditions occur to give rise to them A first truth is a knowledge which, though developed on occasion of observation and reflection, is not derived from observation and reflection. A. H. Strong. The mind is so constituted that its nature is to recognize certain things as being true without proof or instruction. And there is nothing surer in psychology than the intuitive faculty

Intuitions belong to the three departments of (1) the senses, (2) the understanding, (3) the moral nature. Common examples of them are time, space, substance, causation, moral responsibility, self, God. To these might also be added as further illustrations other ideas obtained intuitively, as beauty, that things equal to the same thing are equal to one another, that the whole is equal to the sum of all its parts. These things are perceived by the mind to be true as soon as they are presented, without any logical processes, demonstration, or instruction from without. One does not need to be told there is space. On the occurrence of the appropriate occasion the mind at once leaps to the conclusion that space is a reality and necessary it could not but be. Probably many persons have never reasoned about the necessity of space, yet they have believed space a reality from early infancy and act upon it every time they use a measuring rule. And what is true of space is also true of substance. Many adults have never reasoned that substance is a reality or felt the need of such reasoning. They know intuitively that substance is, and act on their conviction continually in every use of the senses. Men need not be taught the actuality of time. Duration, like space, cannot but be. When the proper conditions occur to give rise to the idea, men simply know time is and act on that knowledge; hence they own clocks and watches. Causality, or the idea that every effect has a cause, is likewise self-evident, and the common sense of mankind has always affirmed it to be true. Only in philosophical speculation is this and other intuitive truths denied. So likewise psychologists refer all necessary ideas and truths to intuition. The great moral truths of God, moral obligation, and future existence are also intuitively known, and are questioned only when the mind is influenced by speculative theories.

It is not affirmed here that innate ideas are always consciously held as true. The idealist who denies the actuality of matter yet acts on the fact of his intuitive belief in the reality of matter. He cannot do otherwise. Men perceive and act on the great truths of intuition that are necessary to their very being without first reasoning about them. They are, in fact necessary to reasoning and too important to mans welfare to be left to a process so uncertain as fallible human reasoning. The simplest act requires the assumption of important truths. When I take up my pen to write I manifest belief in (1) substance, of which the pen consists; (2) space, in which that substance is; (3) self, as distinguished from externality, without which I cannot take the pen; (4) time, without which change of relation to the pen is impossible; and (5) causation, or self-determination, without the fact of which it would be impossible to attempt this or any other accomplishment.

The reality of intuitive knowledge is evident from what thus far has been stated. From these more generally recognized intuitions we may learn those characteristics or criteria by which we may in turn test those other truths whose intuitive character is questioned. These criteria of all intuitions then, upon careful consideration, will be found to be two universality and necessity. In the nature of things, these are inclusive of each other. If a matter be necessary of belief, it must be a universal belief. On the other hand, if an idea is universally believed and acted upon it must be because no man can reasonably call it in question.

2. Proofs that the Idea of God Is an Intuition. In affirming that the knowledge of God is innate, let it not be supposed that a complete apprehension of God in all his perfections as described in the Scriptures is possible by this means. It is here affirmed only that the idea of a superior being on whom we are dependent and to whom we are responsible is an intuition. Doubtless this original idea of God needs to be and may be vastly broadened and given more definiteness by reasoning concerning it, but only by a supernatural revelation can we have accurate knowledge of him. Let us test the idea of God as being an intuition by applying the test of universality and necessity, the criteria of innate ideas.

 (1) Universality of the Idea of God. What is the proof that the idea of God is universal? It is a fact of history that the vast majority of the race have been religious, and acknowledged thereby their belief in a superior being or beings. This is a matter of common knowledge, and so much so that proof is superfluous. Belief in God has been characteristic of the ancient Egyptians, the Babylonians, Syrians, Phenicians, Greeks, Romans, all European nations past and present, the inhabitants of the populous countries of the Far East, the American Indians, and the African Negroes.

But it is objected that whole tribes have been found by travelers and missionaries, which were so degraded that they seemed to possess no idea of God whatever. In answer it may be said that these very tribes who seemed on slight acquaintance to be entirely destitute of the idea of God, upon further investigation were found to hold it. And it is not unreasonable to suppose that this will always be found to be true of all such which at first are seemingly atheistic tribes. In some instances missionaries have labored for years among very degraded people before they found traces of a general belief in the supernatural, due to the natives shrinking from making known to strangers those mysteries, which they held sacredly secret.

But suppose such an ignorant and degraded tribe of atheists were found to exist? Would such an exception be proof that the mass of mankind in the normal condition are also thus ignorant? Or if a tribe of idiots should be discovered, would their existence prove that reason is not normal to mankind? Would it not rather be assumed that the extreme degradation of such a tribe had resulted in their losing the use of an important and essential part of human nature? Does the fact that some men are born deaf disprove the sense of hearing as normal to men? Or does the frequency of infanticide among a people disprove the reality of parental affection?

Again, it is objected that some persons born deaf and blind affirm that they had no knowledge of God until taught concerning him. It seems scarcely possible that such persons should have been void of any feeling of moral obligation, and this implies the idea of God in a measure. Doubtless they had no such conception of God as they came to have in the light of divine revelation, and in comparing their lack of knowledge of God with what they afterward came to have they assumed they were entirely without an idea of God in early life. Also the argument of the preceding paragraph applies here, that the ignorance of a few such persons no more proves that the vast majority of them are without a normal intuitive knowledge of God than to suppose that a few idiots blind and deaf from birth would disprove rationality as normal in persons born without the senses of sight and hearing.

Or again, it is objected to the doctrine that the idea of God has its source in intuition, that there are men here and there, even educated men in a few instances, who are professed atheists. The unreasonableness and absurdity of holding atheism will be shown later, but here it may be said that it is only by philosophical speculation that one may have such views. It no more disproves the intuitive knowledge of God than the intuition of substance is disproved by the fact that a certain class of philosophers deny its reality when holding idealism, or than the intuition of free will is disproved by the denial of it on the part of those whose false philosophy requires them to hold necessitarianism. With the proof of the universality of the idea of God it is shown to meet the first criterion of intuitions.

 (2) Necessity of the Idea of God. Proof of the universality of the idea of God is essentially proof that the idea of God is also necessary as the cause of its universality. It is true that a few persons do, in contradiction to the laws of their nature, deny the being of God; but such denial is always forced and can be only temporary. It is only when under the influence of a false philosophical theory that the mind can thus go contradictory to its nature, but as soon as that theory is out of the mind it will naturally revert to its intuitive conviction of God as surely as the pendulum when unconstrained hangs perpendicularly to the horizon. And as the pendulum may be caused to vary from a perpendicular position by holding a powerful magnet near it, so intuitions are perverted by unsound theories. That the idea of a personal God is necessary to man has been well demonstrated in the history of certain of the great world religions. Buddhism was atheistic in its creed as originally held, and Hinduism is likewise pantheistic. But their millions of devotees are human, and this primitive conviction in them that God, is and that he is a person is so strong that in spite of their creeds they have ever acted out that conviction. The divinely implanted tendency to pray has been so irresistible that they cannot refrain from it. In fact, Buddhists have been compelled to modify those very atheistic tenets of their faith because they were lacking in correspondence with a great demand of human nature. This alone is sufficient proof that the idea of God is necessary, which is the second criterion of intuitions and therefore proof that the idea of God is an intuition. Psychologists refer all necessary truths to intuition.

 (3) The Bible Assumes It. The Scriptures nowhere attempt the proof of the existence of God. It is assumed as being a truth already known and accepted. The opening verse of the Bible names God as the Creator, but does not wait to introduce him. Doubtless this is due to both the inspiring Spirit and the wise human writer recognizing the superfluity of such an introduction. This reasoning from the Scriptures to prove the innate knowledge of God will have no value, of course, in proving his existence to an unbeliever except as corroboration of proofs from other sources, but it is important to believers in the divine revelation not only as corroboration but as proof of the universality of such knowledge by the assumption of so important a fact by the Scriptures.

 (4) Its Importance requires it Also it is altogether reasonable to infer that the idea of God is a first truth because of its vast importance in determining moral obligation and for mans present and eternal welfare. As Robespierre said, If God did not exist, it would behoove man to invent him. If the idea of God were not an intuition, it ought to be. That the knowledge of a matter of such vast consequence should be left to the uncertainties of educational processes, or should be a mere accident of the minds circumstances, is inconceivable. The only proper original source of the knowledge of God is in the constitution of the mind itself. The idea of God must be available to all alike, and not possible merely to those who are so fortunate as to be taught about him or whose rational powers are sufficiently developed to arrive at such knowledge by logical processes.

II. Other Supposed Sources of the Idea

1. From Animistic Superstition. Animism is that form of superstition, common to the more degraded portions of the race, which believes that certain rocks, trees, streams, springs, caves, etc., are animated or inhabited by spirits which must be worshiped and which will do injury to those who neglect such worship. The spirits which these barbarous people fear and worship are their gods, and animism is therefore closely related to their religion. Naturalistic evolution and other antitheistic philosophies refer the origin of religion and of the idea of God to such animistic superstition, and on the theory that even religion is the result of a process of evolution. They assume that animism was common to primitive man, that from that superstitious fear of spirits which he supposed dwelt in these various material objects he came to worship many idols in the forms of various images, etc., that with increased culture he evolved a higher polytheism, and that from this came the monotheistic idea of a Supreme Being. That this is the theory as held by those classes of philosophers mentioned is evident from the statement of E. B. Taylor in Primitive Culture, Animism is . . . the groundwork of the philosophy of religion

At this point it may be well to state that we have no sympathy with this theory. Our objection to such an origin of the idea of God is not only because it is contradictory to the teaching of the Scripture, but, and especially, because it is not true to the plain facts of the earliest history of the race. From the history of religion it is clear that the tendency of religion is to degenerate rather than to rise to a purer form. Such has been true of the various great ethnic religions. Such has also been true of the true religion. Ancient Israel were continually departing from the exalted form of worship given them by Moses. And even Christianity has ever struggled against the degenerating tendencies with which it has come in contact, which are doubtless to be accounted for on the ground of depraved human nature. The theory that our idea of God came by a process of evolution from a primitive fear of imaginary spirits in material inanimate objects is a mere a priori assumption.

What does the actual history of religions have to say on this subject? Were the primitive ideas of God polytheistic, or monotheistic? According to the most dependable authorities and best scholars, the earliest religions of mankind were purely monotheistic, and disallowed many gods. Renouf supported this view of the religion of ancient Egypt and maintained there were very many eminent scholars who held the same view. That the primitive religion of the Chinese was monotheistic is maintained by James Legge, who was professor of the Chinese language and literature in Oxford University. The very ancient Aryans, from whom sprang the Hindus, Persians, and most of the great European nations, held monotheism. Many eminent authorities in support of a primitive monotheism are cited by Dr. F. F. Ellinwood in his Oriental Religions and Christianity (pp. 222-265).

2. Exclusively from Revelation. It is the opinion of some theologians that the mind is capable of a knowledge of God only by supernatural revelation. It has been reasoned in support of this view that such persons as Adam, Abraham, or Moses, to whom God gave such revelation, have had the clearest knowledge of God and that to the extent that men have been remote from these original revelations, either geographically or chronologically, they have held less correct ideas of God unless they have had the Scripture records of those revelations. This view has been made especially prominent by Watson and others who doubtless were caused to take this position out of reverence for the Word of God and especially in opposition to the false claims for the natural religion of English deism with which they came into conflict. Probably this very controversy which raged in their day influenced them unduly against the intuition of Gods existence. Doubtless revelation is needed to enlarge and develop the innate idea of God, yet unless man already possessed the idea of God the revelation from God could have no authority for him, whether that revelation were transmitted by oral tradition or by the Scriptures.

3. From a Process of Reasoning. Many of those who reject the idea of God as an intuition would refer the origin of the idea to a process of reasoning. Doubtless the mind is capable of learning about God by rational processes, but such a method of first obtaining the idea is rather a theoretical possibility than an actual fact. The mind does not wait for reasoning, or a logical process. When the proper conditions are brought about, the idea flashes on the soul with the quickness and force of an immediate revelation That reasoning is not the means of gaining the idea of God is evident from the fact that the strength of mens conviction of the being of God is not in proportion to their powers of reason. Multitudes of men who cannot grasp the logical argument of the divine existence yet have an unwavering conviction of its truth, while others of extraordinary reasoning power are skeptics.

What then is the place of reasoning as a means of knowing about God? First it must be allowed that rational arguments do much to enlarge and extend our intuitive idea of God. We can thus come to a clearer apprehension of his character and attributes. Again, these arguments for the divine existence have value in corroborating and confirming the intuitive conviction as being true, as by reasoning we may prove the veracity of the intuition that the whole is equal to the sum of all the parts. Yet the mind finds itself in possession of this knowledge immediately on the occurrence of the proper conditions, before it has time to reason.

III. What Does This Intuition Contain?

To know that any particular thing or person exists, one must necessarily know somewhat as to the nature, properties, qualities, characteristics, or attributes of that thing or person. Such knowledge is inseparable from the knowledge of the existence of the thing in the nature of the case. Therefore to know that God is, is necessarily to have some idea as to what God is, or concerning his attributes. The intuition that God exists contains also some idea of his nature. This does not mean that one can know God by intuition adequately for the performance of all human duties. The gross misconceptions that have mutilated mens thought of God are sufficient proof that at least in their present depraved condition men do not intuitively know the nature of God in important respects. How clear would be the contents of the intuition of God to one who has never known the moral perversion of depraved human nature cannot be known. Yet when all this has been said, the fact remains that Gods nature is known in a considerable measure. The intuition of God implies: (1) a personal being who may be properly worshiped; (2) a perfection of moral character in God that places men under moral obligation to him; (3) a power above on whom men are dependent. At least this much is contained in the intuition of God.

CHAPTER II

EVIDENCES OF GODS EXISTENCE

Although belief in Gods existence is an intuition of the mind of man and arises spontaneously under proper conditions, yet theistic arguments have great value for corroboration and confirmation of that innate idea. Rational evidences should not be despised as being useless. The mind craves rational satisfaction, such as only logical argument can give concerning this great truth. Also the intuition alone is not in a position to meet the subtle attacks of skepticism. False reasoning must be met with rational argument. Again formal argumentation is helpful in developing the intuitive idea of God, in explaining it and in illustrating it. Though the mind instinctively believes before philosophy has begun to set its proofs in order yet the mind naturally seeks to supply to itself a logical account of its belief. However conclusive the proofs of theism may be, it is always to be remembered that the knowledge of God is not dependent upon them. The arguments are not held to demonstrate the fact of God, but they do show a degree of probability of the divine existence that amounts to certainty. Also, each argument need not be regarded as proving the whole doctrine of theism. One argument may prove one fact about God, and others other facts; so the various arguments constitute a series of proofs that is cumulative in nature.

The most common arguments for theism are four in number:

 (1) The First-cause, or Cosmological; (2) the Design, or Teleological; (3) the Human nature, or Anthropological; (4) the A Priori, or Ontological. To these is sometimes added a fifth the Biblical, or Revelation, Argument.

I. The First-Cause, or Cosmological, Argument

This argument for the Divine existence is based upon the fact of causation. Regarding the universe in its present form as an effect, it reasons that it must have had a sufficient cause. Because something cannot come from nothing, and something now exists, therefore something has always existed. It further reasons that the original cause which is responsible for the beginning of the universe as we now know it must have been an eternal cause, and also a free cause that could volitionate at a particular time the beginning of matter or the beginning of those changes in what most antitheists unscripturally regard as already existing matter that have resulted in the present universe. This free cause can be no less than an eternal person indefinitely great, whom we know as God.

The argument may be put more exactly in syllogistic form, as follows: Major Premise. Everything begun, whether substance or change in things before existing, must have had a sufficient preexisting cause.

Minor Premise. The world in every part is continually changing.

Conclusion. Therefore the world must have a cause outside of itself and the original cause must be eternal, uncaused, and possessing free will.

Two truths are requisite to the cosmological argument: (1) the principle of causation; (2) the universe is an effect of a cause outside itself. If these are shown to be true, the argument is sound proof of Gods existence.

1. The Law of Causation. Causation is self-evident and is universally recognized. It is a truth so thoroughly ineradicable, so universal, and so necessary that it must be regarded, as is the idea of God itself, as being an intuition of the reason. That every event must have a cause is the belief of all men. And cause, to be a cause, must be cause sufficient or adequate to the result accomplished. If it is not such, it is not a cause.

Only in philosophical speculation do men ever think of denying the principle of causation. Such men as Hume and Mill have had the boldness to deny it theoretically, but they themselves in reasoning about the origin of the world and of the things it contains do not fail to employ the truth of causation. They have maintained that the idea of cause is the result of associating in our minds one thing with another and by the observation of invariable sequence wrongly assuming the first thing to be the cause of the second. But common sense tells us there is more in the relation of what we call cause and effect than mere regular succession. There is no more regular succession than day and night, yet who would suppose night is caused by day and day is caused by night? Or who would say that summer and winter cause each other merely because of their invariably following each other?

But cause is more than the mere antecedent of an event. It is an antecedent to whose efficiency an event as an effect is due. The only cause of which we are immediately conscious is our own wills. We take a book from a shelf and lay it on the table. We know the location of the book on the table is the result of a cause and that personal will is that cause. We know the book would never have passed from the shelf to the table except for a cause. Likewise we may properly regard every event as being the result of a cause even though we are not that cause. It is true there may be dependent causes that are themselves the results of other causes, but reason requires an original and eternal cause of all these dependent causes that is independent and free.

But the objector to the First-cause Argument professes to find an alternative in the idea of an infinite regressive series of dependent causes. But such an infinite series of causes and effects is unreasonable, because a mere series of changes must itself have had a cause. The infinite-series idea is like the chain that hangs on nothing. To follow back through any number of dependent causes as links in a chain is not, to find the first and real cause. The mind cannot be content to rest in such an endless-series idea, but instinctively leaps to the thought of an independent first cause. But further disproof of the in-finite-series idea is needless. No one believes it. It is used in antitheistic reasoning only as an objection to sound theistic argument, and then is cast away by those who use it.

Again, it is objected to the idea of a necessary independent first cause that the world may be regarded as being many interacting parts as dependent causes. It is as if the points of four pencils were placed upon the table and the tops leaned against each other in the form of a pyramid so that they are mutually self-supporting. We readily admit that the universe is constituted with these interacting dependent causes. It is a fact of science and is open to the observation of all men. Sandstone is formed from beds of sand, and beds of sand are the result of the crumbling of the stone again. The blood is kept pure by the respiration of the lungs, and yet the lungs cannot continue to function except by a supply of pure blood. But allowing all this, these interacting dependent causes need a cause for their being and interaction. As Bowne has well said, An interacting many cannot exist without a coordinating one No number of dependent causes can constitute an independent cause when added together, as independence cannot originate in dependence. Back of all these interacting dependent causes, then, must be an independent cause that coordinates them and causes their interaction, as in the aforementioned pyramid of pencils that support each other, an independent external cause must arrange the pencils so they will support each other. Reason requires, not only for the series of causes, but also for the interacting system of causes, a real and independent cause of that series or system.

Any real cause, then, must be an original cause, not merely an intermediate link in a chain of dependent cause and effects. The mind will be content with nothing less than that cause which supports the most distant dependent cause. And reason requires that the original cause be eternal in duration. Nothing cannot be a cause. Something exists now and it could not have come out of antecedent nothingness; so somewhat must have always existed that caused all things as they now are.

Again, any real cause must be a free cause. An uncaused cause is a free cause. G. P. Fisher, Natural Theology, p. 14. If it acts of necessity it is dependent, and must itself be only an effect and a result of another cause. Only an independent cause can be a free cause; and independent, free cause certainly implies free will in a conscious independent being. Man has the power of first cause of certain effects because of his free will. Both from intuition and from rational processes it is certain that real original cause is to be attributed only to a personal will; therefore to whatever extent it can be shown that the world is the result of a cause exterior to itself we have proof of a personal God as creator.

2. The Universe is an Effect As it now exists, the universe is an effect. Nothing is more strongly stressed by modern science than that both organic and inorganic nature are the result of a process and came to be what they are through a process. Man is evidently of comparatively recent origin, according to science. Before man, the lower forms of life had a beginning, and beyond them was a period when no life existed an azoic state. Even the nebular and evolutionary hypotheses hold that all things which now exist had a beginning and have been evolved from a primordial fire-mist. But this beginning must have had a cause, for a beginning is an event, and every event must have a cause. A spontaneous generation of the primitive life is not admissible with science, and is practically a denial of the principle of causation, as will be shown later. Also, that alleged primordial fire-mist cannot have been the eternal and original cause of all, for if it were eternal it would have been mature, or fully developed. And if so, it could not have further developed into a universe. Also if it were eternal it would necessarily be immutable and could not change. But if it changed, that is proof it is not eternal, but is like all other changing forms of matter a result of a cause. The minute physical divisions of matter, the molecules, being of exact equality, bear the marks of being manufactured articles and not eternal or self-existent, according to Sir John Hersehell.

3. What the Argument Proves. With the proof, then, of the principle of causation and that the universe is an effect of which no sufficient cause is to be found in itself, reason requires an adequate extra-mundane cause, eternal and uncaused, possessing free will and omnipotent power. These necessary qualities point strongly to the personality of the first cause. The Cosmological Argument, then, furnishes proof of theism with a degree of certainty little short of a demonstration, by proving the fact of a first cause, that that cause is eternal, uncaused, unchangeable, omnipotent, free, and, we may safely say in harmony with many able thinkers, a personal Cause who is God.

II. The Design, or Teleological, Argument

1. Nature of the Argument. The Design, or Teleological, Argument reasons from marks of design, or from orderly and useful arrangements, in nature to an intelligent cause. It is not, however, a reasoning from design to a designer, as it is sometimes wrongly stated; for design implies a designer; but rather a reasoning from marks of design to a designer.

By design is meant the selection and pursuit of ends. It is the choosing of an end to be attained, the selection of proper means to accomplish it, and the use of the means to attain the end chosen. When we see at the foot of a rocky cliff broken fragments of rock of unequal sizes, irregular and uneven shapes, strewn about regardless of their relation to each other, we decide at once the size, shape, and location of them is a result of chance. But when we see hundreds of bricks of equal size, even color, and faces all bearing one imprint, laid in straight, level rows in hard mortar and forming a perpendicular wall with suitable openings for windows and doors, we decide the qualities and arrangement of them are the result of intelligent purpose or design. It is not necessary that one shall have seen the bricks manufactured and laid in the wall to know the wall is the result of design. The very fact of orderly and useful arrangement therein is abundant proof of contrivance by an intelligent being.

The Design Argument may be given in syllogistic form, as follows:

Major Premise. Orderly and harmonious cooperation of many separate parts can be accounted for only by the assumption of an intelligent cause.

Minor Premise. The world everywhere exhibits orderly and harmonious cooperation of all its parts.

Conclusion. Therefore the original and absolute cause of the world is an intelligent cause.

As in the works of man we reason from marks of design to an intelligent designer, so we may as properly reason from evidences of contrivance, or evidences of adaptation of means to ends, in nature, that the author of nature is intelligent. Nor is it necessary that we shall have known by observation and experience that an intelligent agent is behind nature. It is enough that we know from experience what are the characteristic signs of intelligence. Then when we see those signs whether in the contrivances of man or in nature we properly decide they are the result of an intelligent mind. The very nature of design is such that it implies intelligence, and wherever marks of contrivance are found it is certain they must be referred to intelligence. Not only in the origin of nature as shown in the First-cause Argument must we recognize the principle of causation, but also in the orderly arrangement of nature as set forth in the Design Argument.

Orderly and useful arrangement in nature is certain. Marks of design are apparent everywhere and are conclusive proof that the author of nature is an intelligent person. All science assumes that nature is rationally constructed. Huxley said, Science is the discovery of a rational order that pervades the universe Except for that uniformity which shows nature to be a system and a result of design science would be impossible. The results of chance cannot be understood by the mind. But the universe can be understood by the mind, showing dearly that it is the result of a mind. It may be objected that the orderly arrangements in nature are not designed to be useful but are merely used because they can be used. But he who says the eye sees merely because it can see, the ear hears merely because it can hear, the hand handles only because capable of doing so and that none of them were designated to perform such functions says what the common sense of men everywhere refuses to accept. As well might it be said that the locomotive draws its train merely because it can draw it, not because it was built to do so; or that the printing-press prints books because it can do so, not because it was designed to do so. How much more reasonable it is to believe that useful arrangements in nature as well as in human devices are the result of the selection and pursuit of ends, or that the beneficial functioning of nature is as it is because a kind and gracious Father designed it so for the sake of his children.

What being, says Cicero, that is destitute of intellect and reason could have produced these things which not only had need of reason to cause them to be, but which are such as can be understood only by the highest exertions of reason? (De Nat. Deorum, II, 44).

Probably the Design Argument cannot be better illustrated than it has been by William Paley (Natural Theology, p. 5). His argument in substance is as follows: If in crossing a field I strike my foot against a stone and ask how it came there, I might reply that it has been there forever. But if later in my walk I find a watch and the question of the origin of the watch be raised, the answer must be very different. A casual observance of its mechanism of its wheels with cogs exactly fitting into each other, of its springs, of the relation of part to part, and of its exact adjustment so that it exactly measures time furnishes convincing proof that it is a reliable example of human contrivance, and not the result of chance. And even the discovery in the watch of useless, broken, or deranged parts would not invalidate the reasoning that it was designed by an intelligent mind. For more than a century Dr. Paleys argument has stood unanswered, and it may properly be regarded as unanswerable. Advancement in science has made minor adjustments necessary, and to the extent the evolutionary hypothesis has been given place an extra link must be allowed in the argument, yet it still stands in all its strength.

To carry Paleys watch illustration a step farther, suppose that watch I find in the field has not only a fine mechanism for the measurement of time, but also contains within itself an elaborate machine-shop with lathes and other necessary machinery and has the ability to manufacture other watches like itself, and not only as good, but better watches than itself, and that it had itself been evolved from a less perfect watch. Would such remarkable ability in that hypothetical watch disprove a designing intelligence behind that race of watches? If watches came from other watches, they would not be so immediately the result of intelligent design, but certainly the cause that originated them and involved in that first watch those wonderful qualities later evolved must have been indeed an intelligence far superior to that manifested in actual watches as they have been designed by men. Then if evolution were admitted as a process in nature, instead of invalidating the idea of design and the design argument for Gods existence, it would strengthen it. Whether the theory of evolution be regarded as true or false, we may consistently cite marks of design in proof of an intelligent creator, though in the one case design would be less directly manifested than in the other, yet just as really shown.

The Design Argument is probably the simplest and most convincing of all theistic proofs. It has been appealed to by theists of all times, nations, and religions. It is frequently referred to in the Scriptures. The heavens declare the glory of God; and the firmament sheweth his handiwork (Psa. 19: 1). In Rom. 1:20 the apostle Paul affirms that Gods eternal power may be clearly seen in the things that are made. Heathen philosopher, including Anaxagoras, Socrates, and Cicero, made much use of it. So did also the Jewish writer Philo. All the church fathers and theologians until the present day have appealed to it in proof of theism. Truly God hath not left himself without witness among all men.

Evidences of Design in Nature. The marks of intelligent contrivance in nature are countless. They may be found on every hand. They may be seen in the movements of the vast planets far away in the starry sky and also in every minute insect on the earth. In all the realm of inorganic nature they are to be found, as well as in every plant that grows. And again, they may be found in large numbers in each of the millions of bodies of both animals and men. They appear, not only in single organs, but also in the relation of organs to each other. Evidences of design are also apparent in the adaptations of the world to the life of plants and animals, and of the organs of animals to their instincts. Limited space excludes an extended exhibition of examples of design in nature, but those here given will serve at least as an indication of the nature of the evidence.

The remarkable operation of an intricate machine often fills a thoughtful person with wonder, and he is impressed with the far-seeing design and intelligence of its inventor. But how much more wonderful is the human body, and how much more does it show design! What machine is so perfect in its mechanism and operation as is this one? All its parts, organs, and functions are nicely adjusted to each other. It repairs its defective parts while in operation, and generates its own energy. But it is through definite concrete examples that the most vivid impression of design in nature is received.

If the intricate lens of a camera manifests design, how much more does the eye? Their general principles are similar; but how much more perfect is the eye than the lens of a camera! It is not an opening in the head, nor a mere nerve center such as one might suppose from what some evolutionists say in attempting an evolutionary theory of its origin. It has a lid as a means of protecting the tender ball, and that lid moves with wonderful quickness. The ball is not set immovable in its socket, but has muscles so attached to it that it can be turned in all directions of the field of vision. Again, the structure of the eyeball is wonderfully adapted to the light, and to the function of seeing. The opening to the lens is contracted or enlarged, in adjustment to the amount of light falling upon the retina, by a most delicate arrangement of muscles that are not dependent upon the will, but on the stimulus of the light itself. The lens itself is capable of such exact adjustment that the rays of light are refracted in such a manner as to bring them to a proper focus on the retina. Spread out on this retina is the only nerve in the body susceptible of light and color. These are but a few of the evidences of design in the structure of the eye. As certainly as design may be seen in any human contrivance, it may be seen in this wonderful organ. But what unthinking credulity must that be which would rather attribute the intricate wonders of the eye to chance, or another non-intelligent cause! And if it-be objected that the eye, with all its wonders, may be the result of evolution, it is not necessary to argue the point, but only to say in reply: Then how far-seeing and intelligent must have been the designer to implant the power to effect by a process of evolution that wonderful organ as we now know it.

Likewise the ear is not a mere opening into the head, but a very delicate and complicated device for catching sound waves and producing the sensation of hearing by means of the auditory nerve. It is a far more wonderful mechanism than that exhibited in a telephone or radiophone receiving instrument; and as they bear undeniable evidence of design by man, so does this much more of a designing creator. If space would allow, proofs of design might be shown in various other organs, as of digestion, reproduction, the heart, the lungs, the nerves, and in the bones, muscles, and skin, which are all wonderfully adapted to their use. But these have been exhaustively discussed by many able writers, to whom those are referred who would pursue this phase of the subject farther (see Natural Theology [Paley]. Bridge-water Treatises. Natural Theology [Fisher]).

Not only in single organs is design shown, but also in the relation of organs to each other and to the conditions under which the animal is to live. The fish, suited to live in the water, as shown by his gills, has also fins and tail adapted to swimming, as is also the shape of its body. The bird with wings suitable for flying in the air has also hollow bones and feathers, which make flight possible. The bird with long legs for wading in the water has also a long neck. And the bird that floats on the water has feathers impenetrable by water, and webbed feet. Even man, with a mind superior to all other animals and capable of wonderful contriving, has also an upright body and a hand capable of executing all the mind contrives. Mans hand is far better adapted to work than is the hand of any species of ape. In fact, the human hand is so remarkable in its mechanism that Dr. Charles Bell has written an entire volume about it as an example of design. What wise design is shown by this relation of organs! And fully as remarkable is that design shown in adapting organs to instincts of particular species. Carnivorous animals have claws and teeth suited to catching and eating their prey, while those with an instinct for eating vegetables have teeth and stomachs adapted to their instinct.

A still more remarkable example of design is the provision for the support of the young even before they are born. With mammals, the breasts or udder of the mother begin to swell and store a supply of milk; so as soon as the young are born, the most nourishing food possible is ready for them. Similarly, a food-supply is also stored in the egg. Certainly here is proof of a wise, foreseeing mind that designed these things so.

Even in inorganic nature are to be seen marks of a similar wise design. Except for the fact of evaporation of moisture in the atmosphere by heat, and its condensation by cold, life would be impossible on the earth. On warm summer days life would be destroyed by the intense heat except for the fact that heat is taken up by the moisture of the earth, vegetation, or bodies of water as the water becomes vapor. Likewise, on the cool summer nights vegetation would die of frost and cold, and life would consequently soon become extinct on the earth, except for the condensation of the vapor in the atmosphere into the dew; as it thus condenses, a vast amount of heat stored during the day is given out and the temperature is kept moderate. What a wonderful provision is this! It is either a proof of design by a kind creator, or else a result of chance. The atheist may be credulous enough to believe the latter, but the common sense of mankind has always felt constrained to attribute it to the design of a heavenly Father.

It is a general law of nature that bodies contract as they cool. Water becomes heavier as it cools and the cold water settles to the bottom, while the warmer remains at the top. But by a special law of nature that is very singular, ice does not first form at the bottom of a body of water, but when the temperature of that water at the bottom falls to about four degrees above the freezing-point it begins to expand and becomes lighter; so ice always forms on top first. Except for this special law the larger bodies of water in the temperate zone would soon become solid masses of ice, frozen from the bottom to the top, that would not melt during the entire summer and all life in them would perish. If this special provision in nature does not show design in nature, then what could show it? Even the theory of evolution cannot account for such a provision; but it must be regarded as a direct result of design.

The power of gravitation is so common; we are apt to overlook it. But suppose the attraction of gravitation were but one fourth as strong as it is; how difficult it would be to keep our houses on their foundations, and what a task it would be to keep on ones feet on windy days! Or imagine the drawing of gravitation four times as strong as it is now how tired one would become of his own weight, and especially of carrying necessary burdens! If heavy persons should sit or lie down, they would be unable ever to rise up again. Or suppose the axis of our earth were perpendicular to our sun instead of inclined; then no changing seasons would ever be known, but only one long, monotonous, changeless temperature. Surely a kind creator has wisely designed all these things.

3. Objections to the Design Argument. It is sometimes objected to the foregoing reasoning that nature does not always appear to bear evidences of design, and useless and rudimentary organs in animals are pointed out as examples. Nor can the existence of such be properly denied. The spleen is sometimes cited as an example of a useless organ. But it may only properly be said that its use is not known to be important. Physiologists are seeking to learn more about its function and purpose. The mere fact that animals may live when it is removed proves only that it is not necessary to life, not that it has no purpose. Knowledge of the important functions of the large majority of the organs of the body gives such evidence of design in creation that present ignorance of the use of a few organs cannot invalidate it. Also those rudimentary organs such as the teeth of whales, which they never need, and mamma in males of the higher species are cited as not supporting the Design Argument. In answer it may be said, first, that such are only in organic nature, and there are very few in number. Also it is a low view of utility that considers only the immediate wants of organisms. In a vehicle or a building, some parts serve a good purpose in giving beauty, symmetry, and unity. Doubtless some of these rudimentary organs are best understood as serving this purpose. They are merely the characteristic features of the type, even though the individual does not need them.

Again, it is objected to the Design Argument that all may have come as a result of chance. Inasmuch as they are few who thus deify chance, our answer may be brief. This objection will not be held by one who stops to think. It is affirmed that the world might have come to be by chance just as the Iliad might have been produced by throwing down quantities of letters. But every one knows that so large a number of separate elements would not accidentally fall into orderly relationship though trials should be made throughout eternity. Long ago Cicero denied the validity of that objection, and referred to that same illustration of thus making a book. Nor is the objection of efficient cause much better. It affirms the eye is the cause of sight, and that it sees because it can see, not because it was designed to see. It may properly be allowed that the eye sees because it can see, but also that it sees because it was made to see. This objection asks us to close our eyes to the marks of design and not think. It is but little better, if any, than the objection of chance, to which it is closely akin.

Another objection to the Design Argument consists in an appeal to the theory of evolution as giving a sufficient account of the present orderly constitution of nature. It is assumed that law, if given sufficient time, can accomplish all that has been accomplished. It overlooks the very important fact that law is not an agent, but only a method by which an agent works; so can do nothing except as it is employed by an agent. Only beings are agents and unless a being were behind any supposed law of evolution, that law could have no efficiency. Whatever might he evolved by such a law must first have been involved by the agent employing the method. Even Darwin, though he at first expressed the belief that natural selection excludes design, was inclined in later life to predicate designed laws, which determine things generally. Then all the intelligent purpose shown in nature now must have controlled the evolution of it from the beginning, if evolution is assumed. Therefore evolution could at the most be no more than a method of an intelligent designer.

Objectors to the Design Argument also sometimes assume an overstrained modesty in theological questions and assert that because of finite intelligence we are not capable of knowing that the world is a result of design, and that all we can know is that things appear to be designed by an intelligent mind for certain ends. But do we not commonly assume that things are as they appear to be? Physical science bases its inductions on the appearance of things. Why may not theology do likewise? And if we cannot fully comprehend the infinite, does it therefore follow that we can know nothing of Gods operation and design in nature? Because we cannot comprehend the vastness of limitless space, shall we cease to recognize what we can comprehend of it?

The last objection to which attention is called is that based upon the operation of instinct. It is said that as blind instinct operating through animals may accomplish results similar to those of intelligent purpose, so all that appears to be design may be the result of such a cause. In reply, let it be first stated that instinct may not be a blind impulse, but, as Paley has defined it, a propensity prior to experience and independent of instruction Certainly it is found only in organisms, and should be regarded as belonging to the animal constitution. It evidently indicates great intelligence in the power that implanted instinct in animals. But there is no reason for attributing instinct to blind force. Instinct itself is a remarkable example of design, and can be adequately accounted for only by regarding it as an instrument of an intelligent mind.

In spite of all objections, the Design Argument for Gods existence still stands in all its strength. Far-seeing design in the author of the universe is evident from both inorganic and organic creation. Marks of wise contrivance are seen everywhere, far surpassing any human ingenuity. The denial of design in creation consistently requires denial of all intelligent contrivance in men. The argument is clearly corroborative of the correctness of our intuition of the existence of a personal God.

III. The Human Nature, or Anthropological, Argument

1. The Argument Described. The Human Nature, or Anthropological Argument is frequently called the Moral Argument, and sometimes the Psychological Argument; but we prefer designating it by the more comprehensive term Anthropological because it reasons from the higher part of human nature generally. It reasons from mans mental, moral, and religious nature that the creator must have possessed a similar nature. In reasoning from effect to an adequate first cause it is like the Cosmological Argument, of which it is a particular example. As the material universe must have had a sufficient cause, so must also the soul of man. The purpose in setting forth this, as a separate argument is that it shows the author of mans soul to be the possessor of a like nature. The lofty powers of the human spirit could never have come from non-intelligent matter and force, but must be assigned to a cause possessing qualities of a far higher grade. This argument also partakes of the nature of that from design in showing the adaptations of human nature to nature as a whole.

It may be stated in part in the form of a syllogism, as follows:

Major Premise. As an intelligent and free moral being, man has had a beginning upon earth.

Minor Premise. Non-intelligent matter and force are not an adequate cause of intelligence, free will, and conscience in man.

Conclusion. Therefore, as an effect, mans spiritual nature can be referred only to a cause possessing intelligence, freedom, and a moral nature, which imply personality.

2. Argument from Mans Intelligence. Man s intellect must have had an adequate cause. But it cannot properly be attributed to the non-intelligent. As well might we expect fullness to emanate from emptiness. Mind cannot have come from matter. That they are essentially different in nature is the general conviction of mankind. Only in speculative theories is the distinction ever denied. In the common consciousness of men as shown by their forms of speech about mind and matter or in referring to conscious existence after death, the distinction is clear. No two ideas are more widely different than those of mind and matter. Matter is known by its properties, but mind only by its phenomena. Also the terms describing each are essentially different. Thought is not conceived of as having length, weight, area, color, thickness, or temperature. Only in figurative usage can any such terms be applied to mind and its phenomena. Inasmuch as an effect cannot contain or be greater than its cause, intelligence cannot have come from the non-intelligent. Nothing can come out of matter not originally in it. In attempting to show mind came from matter, Tyndall recognized this difficulty by calling for a new definition of matter. But no definition of mind and matter or calling mind the inner face of matter can change the facts or bridge the gulf that has ever differentiated mind and matter in fact and in the thought of mankind. The cause of the mind of man is an eternal mind; and because mans mind is, we know God has mind.

3. Argument from Mans Freedom. Another fact concerning the nature of God that may be known from the nature of man is that God is a free being. Mans free will proves he originated from a source possessing free will. It is no more possible that man with his free will could have originated in that which is not free than that fullness should have come out of emptiness. The God of the pantheist could never have produced man. That man has free will is the universal belief of mankind, and is denied only in speculative reasoning. Man possesses a firm conviction of his freedom, from which he cannot alienate himself. Even if he does deny it, he constantly shows by his words and actions that he cannot cease to believe it. But his freedom is not like the water of a river flowing between its banks, which of necessity must flow toward the lower point and is free to do only that. For man has the power of alternative choice. He can change the course of a river and, as he chooses, cause it to flow in any one of several directions. He can build houses, bend iron, or freely act on a body contrary to the power of gravitation. But more will be said about mans freedom in the appropriate place. The fact of his freedom is evidence that his maker is free.

4. Argument from Mans Moral Nature. Our conscience, or feeling of moral obligation, implies One over us to whose law we are responsible. By the very constitution of our nature we have a sense of right and wrong. It is often expressed by the words ought and ought not. It is due to our recognition of one superior to us on whom we are dependent, and who rightfully has authority over us. It has reference to law that we are under and which we recognize as right. Conscience is real, and its requirements are imperative. It cannot be denied or ignored without its reproof. It is not controlled by the will. We cannot free ourselves from its requirements. It demands and rewards obedience, and punishes disobedience. But all this points to a law over us, and that law implies a giver and administrator of it who is over us and not appointed by us. It is also clear that the one above us is a free personal being. It is probably this sense of moral obligation to God especially, which has been the ground of the universal conviction of men that God is. If there were no personal God, then this would be a lie stamped indelibly upon human nature. This cannot be. There must be a personal creator possessed of a moral nature including attributes of justice and righteousness that are reflected in similar qualities in the nature of man as a moral being, for certainly the moral can not come from the non-moral.

5. Argument from Mans Religious Nature. Again, mans religious nature or tendency to worship implies God. Man is incurably religious, and has always and everywhere worshiped. This tendency to worship finds its complement only in a being who, as a person, is capable of communion, and as being perfect is worthy of adoration. Among all plants and animals, and in regard to the physical nature of man there is found no desire, capacity, or necessity but what nature has made adequate provisions to satisfy. Plants require water, and water exists for their satisfaction. Animals and men have an appetite for food, and appropriate food is provided to satisfy. Such a law and means of satisfaction of desire is a general law of nature. Shall we not, then, also suppose there is a complement to the craving of mens souls? The animal nature is fully satisfied by the material things of this world. But the soul has aspirations for things beyond this world. It seeks for fellowship with a higher realm, spiritual and eternal. It has a capacity and desire for loving, trusting, and worshiping a higher being on whom it feels dependent and whom it would fellowship. As thirst of the body of man points to the fact of the existence of water, so certainly does the thirst of the soul prove the existence of God; for one of these desires is as natural and as universal as the other. And when millions of Christians testify that they have found a satisfaction for the souls desires in a blessed fellowship and communion with God, who can consistently deny it?

6. Objections to the Human-nature Argument Various objections are made to this argument; but principally it has been charged with being anthropomorphic, or of ascribing human qualities to God. The objection is well represented by Herbert Spencer as follows: If we make the grotesque supposition that the ticking and other movements of a watch constitute a kind of consciousness, and that a watch possessed of such a consciousness insisted on regarding the watchmaker s action as determined, like its own, by springs and escapements, we should simply complete a parallel of which religious teachers think much. And were we to suppose that a watch not only formulated the cause of its existence in these mechanical terms, but held that watches were bound out of reverence so to formulate this cause, and even vituperated as atheistic watches any that did not venture so to formulate, we should merely illustrate the presumption of theologians by carrying their own argument a step further (First Principles of a New Philosophy, pp. 94, 95). The objection is so well answered by Samuel Harris that his reply is here given, and is deemed a sufficient answer: The objection rests on the absurdity that, if a watch should become endowed with reason, it would still remain a mere machine, just as it was before, and therefore would see nothing in itself but mechanism, and could ascribe nothing but mechanism to its maker. But if a watch were endowed with reason it would no longer be a mere machine, but a rational person. Then contemplating its own mechanism it would infer, precisely as a rational man does in contemplating it, that it had a maker like itself in intelligence, but not necessarily like itself in mechanism. And should this intelligent watch ridicule all intelligent watches that believe they were made by an intelligent maker, it would be like Mr. Spencer ridiculing intelligent men for believing their Creator to be an intelligent being (The Self-revelation of God pp. 434, 435).

IV. The Ontological Argument

1. Statement of the Argument. The Ontological Argument is known as an a priori argument, and is usually made to include all argument for the divine existence that does not reason from effect to cause, as do those we have heretofore considered. It endeavors to show that the real objective existence of God is involved in the idea of such a being. Much stress has been placed upon it by theistic writers of past centuries, and it is principally for this reason it is stated here, rather than because it is commonly regarded now as having value. It has been employed in varying forms by many eminent men, including Anselm (to the original form of it is attributed), Descartes, Samuel Clarke, Kant, and Cousin. As it is representative of the others, Anselms argument is given following, as stated by Dr. Miley: We have the idea of the most perfect being, a being than whom a greater or more perfect cannot be conceived. This idea includes, and must include, actual existence, because actual existence is of the necessary content of the idea of the most perfect. An ideal being, however perfect in conception, cannot answer to the idea of the most perfect. Hence we must admit the actual existence; for only with this content can we have the idea of the most perfect being. This most perfect being is God. Therefore God must exist Or the argument may be stated briefly as follows: Because there exists the idea of the most perfect being possible, consequently such a being actually and necessarily exists.

2. Theatric Value of the Argument The argument is open to criticism on the ground that the existence of the idea of a thing does not prove the existence of that thing. Certainly the argument is not true of all the fantastic forms of which superstitious people have had an idea. But it is answered that the idea of God is an exception because necessary being must be admitted. Whatever theistic value the argument has, it has not been apparent to many capable thinkers, especially of the present. Whether or not its defect can be clearly stated, it certainly is not valuable as a proof, and we agree with the large proportion of modern theistic writers that it is inconclusive as a proof of theism.

CHAPTER III

ANTITHEISTIC THEORIES

Antitheism includes all theories that deny the doctrine of a personal God who is creator, preserver, and ruler of all things. It includes atheism, polytheism, pantheism, materialism, and materialistic evolution. Materialism might be made to include positivism and also naturalistic evolution; but the classification here made, by which positivism is included under materialism and evolution is treated separately, is thought to be the most practical for the majority of readers. In the theistic proofs already given, we have sufficient disproof of all these theories; therefore the purpose here will be principally to show the elements in them opposed to theism.

I. Atheism

1. Souse of Atheism. Atheism is the open and positive denial that God exists. It is a pure negation and affirms nothing. It is a denial of what theism affirms. Few persons openly profess to be atheists because the term itself is one of reproach. Those who deny the existence of a personal God usually profess belief in an impersonal something as being God. Such persons assign to the place of God thought, force, motion, the unknowable, the infinite absolute, or moral order. Herbert Spencer in his New Philosophy deifies force, and regards it as unknowable. But such persons in their endeavor to save themselves from the disgrace and odium of atheism do violence to the correct meaning of the terms God and atheism God does not mean mere force, and he who allows no other God is an atheist, whether he admits it or not. But we will here use Atheism in the more restricted sense, and discuss these other antitheistic theories separately.

2. Unreasonableness of Atheism. Atheism is a most unreasonable profession. As much as any man can consistently say is, I do not know there is a God, and this is only antitheistic agnosticism. What arrogant presumption on the part of him who says, There is no God! How can anyone not infinite in his capacities know there is no God? Unless one is omnipresent: in every place in the universe at the present moment how can he know but that God is somewhere? If he does not fully know every personal being in the universe, how can he know but that one with whom he is unacquainted is God! He arrogates to himself the infinite qualities of God in his denial of God. But if he is not infinite in his knowledge of all places, times, and causes, how can he say God is not somewhere, that he has not been known to act in past ages, or that he has not caused certain things? Surely, The fool hath said in his heart, There is no God!

3. Possibility of Atheism. To have doubts about the being of God is possible, and certainly many persons have doubted. But it is quite another thing to believe there is no God. To believe steadfastly the latter, without doubting, is impossible. So to believe would be to free oneself from the moral law, which can not be done, to reject the cause of all things, and practically deny all existence, as all existence may as reasonably be denied as that of God. By speculation or otherwise, one may arrive at the place where he will temporarily cease to be conscious of his belief in God. But with the removal of that speculative influence he will naturally revert to conscious belief in God.

II. Polytheism

1. Meaning and Origin of Polytheism. Polytheism is from two Greek words meaning many gods. According to this theory the attributes and activities of the infinite God are distributed among many limited gods. The testimony of both the Bible and history is that the original religion of mankind was monotheistic, but that at an early date men apostatized from the worship of the one true God and began to worship many deities. From that time throughout human history polytheism has been widely prevalent, and is even at the present. The worship of a plurality of gods began in nature worship. Men began to serve the creature more than the creator They began to worship the various powers of nature with which they came in contact and by which they were benefited, especially the sun, moon, stars, as well as fire, water, and the air. Then these powers were personified, and later it was assumed that a personal god ruled over each. Especially did the common people come to believe in the actual existence of these imaginary deities. But the more enlightened have usually held either monotheism or pantheism.

2. Different Aspects of Polytheism. The character of polytheism has varied according to the traditions, culture, and other influences prevalent among the people practicing it. Among degraded savages it has degenerated to fetish-worship; with the cultured Greeks of the past it was made to express their refined humanitarianism by deifying their heroic men; while in India, where it originated in pantheistic philosophy, it has been carried to great extremes both for number of deities and also for the degraded character of many of them. The apostle Paul states that in their heathen worship the Gentiles sacrificed to demons and not to God (1 Cor. 10: 20). It is not inconsistent with the known facts of idol-worship, or with the common usage of the term for demons, to say that evil spirits have taken advantage of this apostate worship of polytheism and by supernatural manifestations in relation to it have led its devotees to worship them. This accounts for the alleged supernatural element in polytheistic religions and in a measure for mens faith in them. Probably the error of polytheism is sufficiently shown by the unity displayed in nature, the evil fruits of polytheism, and the positive proofs of theism.

III. Pantheism

1. Definition of Pantheism. Pantheism etymologically means all is God, or that God is all. But probably it would be unfair to the many notable philosophers holding it, to define the theory of pantheism in the very literal sense that the pen with which these words are written is a part of God or that the book the reader holds in his hand is a part of God, yet the idea as represented by them seems to be this. Difficulty attends every attempt briefly to define pantheism, because it has been held so differently in different times and places. To describe its various aspects would be to give a history of it. The oldest pantheism is that of India, where it has been prevalent for thousands of years. It also had a great influence in forming the philosophies of Greece. Modern pantheism had its origin shortly after the Reformation, with Spinoza, one of its ablest advocates.

2. Monistic Aspects of Pantheism Pantheism is strongly monistic, affirming there is but one substance. That one substance is God. Materialistic pantheism asserts this one substance is matter. This is practically atheistic materialism. Idealistic pantheism makes that one substance to be mind. But the common sense of mankind rejects such an idea, and even the supporters of it do not find it possible to act in conformity with their theory. The common form of pantheism affirms of that one absolute substance that it has two modes of manifestation:

(1) As thought it is mind. (2) As extension it is matter. Pantheism denies the personality of God, and allows that he comes to consciousness only in the thoughts of men or higher created orders such as angels. It also denies to God free will and affirms all acts are of God and necessary. Some professed pantheists inconsistently affirm free will; but in its nature pantheism is strongly fatalistic. Spinoza consistently held there is no real self-determination in the universe. Pantheism requires necessitated evolution of all things.

3. Defects of Pantheism. Pantheism is to be rejected for various reasons. Its fundamental principle of monism, or of but a sole substance, is a purely unprovable assumption that is contradicted by the facts of nature. Again, it is objectionable because it denie